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Abstract
The working paper discusses the role of the judicial branch in international negotiations on the
conclusion of treaties, using the situation in Germany as an example. In a first part, the author
examines whether the introduction of courts into the analysis of the institutionalization of international
negotiation systems is impeded, from a theoretical point of view, by the unitary actor assumption often
used in international relations theory. The author doubts the explanatory power of the unitary actor
assumption and denies the possibility to transfer it from the realm of international relations with its
modeling approach to the non-modeling realm of law. In a second part, the paper focuses on the role
of national courts in the negotiation of international agreements, which, in Germany, must in principle
conform with the constitution and are subject to judicial scrutiny. Five examples of major functions of
courts are analyzed: first, the theory of approximation, where the negotiation starting position is turned
into a constitutionally relevant factor, allowing certain derogations from constitutional requirements;
second, the margin of appreciation afforded to the executive; third, the restrictions on the transfer of
power to supranational organizations; fourth, the power of interpretation; and fifth, the power of
initiation. The author concludes that the influence of courts in international negotiations cannot be
ignored and must not be regretted. The courts ensure that the limits of governmental action are
observed, while at the same time showing a remarkable understanding of the realities of international
negotiations.
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A. Introduction
When analyzing the institutionalization of international negotiation systems, the commonplace
assumption that States are the primary actors in international negotiations soon becomes too broad to
provide the details necessary for a deeper understanding of the intricacies of negotiation processes
and outcomes. It does not suffice any more to examine the organizational context in which the state is
embedded; rather, the institutional design of the State itself must be taken into consideration. The
State, thus, turns out to be not one, but several actors with their own preferences and their own legal
prerequisites and restrictions, which can and will influence the starting position, the conduct, and the
results of international negotiations (B). To view the State as a heterogeneous actor may contradict
one of the core assumptions often used in international relations theory. From a legal point of view,
however, all three branches of government influence negotiations on the conclusion of international
agreements. While the importance of the executive with its primary responsibility for foreign affairs1 is
taken for granted, and the role of the legislature, mainly but not exclusively through national ratification
requirements, has attracted considerable research,2 the influence of the national judiciary in
international negotiations merits some closer attention (C).
B. The unitary actor assumption in international relations
I. The State as a unitary actor
Much of international relations theory is based on the assumption that the State is a unitary actor.
Even conflicting theories such as realism and neoliberal institutionalism concur in the belief that States
may be regarded as hierarchically organized entities with one determinable preference-ranking,
making it possible to evaluate gains and losses in the international sphere for the State as a whole.3
                                                     
1 On the often rather abstract discussion whether foreign affairs are primarily an executive function or a function
shared between executive and legislature cf. e.g. Baade, Hans W.: Das Verhältnis von Parlament und
Regierung im Bereich der auswärtigen Gewalt der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1962, 115ff.; Hailbronner,
Kay: Kontrolle der auswärtigen Gewalt, VVDStRL 56 (1997), 7 (10f.); Wolfrum, Rüdiger: Kontrolle der
auswärtigen Gewalt, VVDStRL 56 (1997), 38 (40); Grewe, Wilhelm G.: Zum Verfassungsrecht der
auswärtigen Gewalt, AöR 112 (1987), 521 (521ff.); Schuppert, Folke: Die verfassungsgerichtliche Kontrolle
der auswärtigen Gewalt, 1973, 33ff.; Bryde, Brun-Otto: Sicherheitspolitik zwischen Regierung und Parlament,
Jura 1986, 363 (366ff.).
2 Cf. e.g. Wolfrum (n. 1), 39ff.; Fastenrath, Ulrich: Kompetenzverteilung im Bereich der auswärtigen Gewalt,
1985, 217ff.; Kokott, Juliane: Kontrolle der auswärtigen Gewalt, DVBl 1996, 937 (937ff.); Bernhardt, Rudolf:
Verfassungsrecht und völkerrechtlich Verträge, in: Isensee, Josef; Kirchhof, Paul (eds.): Handbuch des
Staatsrechts, t. 7, 1992, § 174, marg. note 11ff.; Baade (Anm. 1), p. 77ff.; Tomuschat, Christian: Parliamentary
control over foreign policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, in: Cassese, Antonio: Parliamentary control
over foreign policy, 1980, 25 (25ff.).
3 Cf. Keohane, Robert O.: Neoliberal institutionalism: A perspective on world politics, in: Keohane, Robert O.:
International institutions and state power - Essays in international relations theory, 1989, 1 (2); Keohane,
Robert O.: Theory of world Politics: Structural realism and beyond, in: Keohane, Robert O.: International
institutions and state power - Essays in international relations theory, 1989, 35 (40, 62); Waltz, Kenneth N.:
Theory of International politics, 1979, 60ff.; critically on these views Milner, Helen V.: Interest, institutions, and
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Proponents of this point of view argue that it is impossible to understand world politics simply by
looking inside of States. If the situation of actors affects their behavior and influences their
interactions, then, it is said, attempted explanation at the unit level will lead to the infinite proliferation
of variables, because at that level no one variable, or set of variables, is sufficient to produce the
observed result. A heterogeneous approach supposedly does not comprehend what is causally
important. For it is not only the individual characters and motives of the State actors that explain the
results of international relations, but also causes that operate among the actors collectively, i.e.
causes inherent in the international system. Looking inside of States omits these causes at the system
level and tries to replace them by attributing characteristics, motives, duties, and the like to the actors.
Replacing factors that derive from the system by such attributes, however, distorts the existing causal
relationships.4 The texture of international politics remains highly constant in the face of major
domestic changes. The similarity and repetition of international outcomes persists despite wide
variations in the attributes and in the interactions of the agents that supposedly cause them.5
II. Domestic politics matter
From an interdisciplinary point of view, especially one influenced by legal training, the unitary actor
assumption seems, at first, baffling. Common sense seems to reveal that domestic politics matter
greatly in the conduct of foreign affairs.6 Party and coalition politics in the German government, the
specific interests of the German Länder or the lobbying by trade, industry, and labor unions: none of
these factors is restricted to purely internal affairs. Quite on the contrary, the growing
internationalization on a European as well as worldwide level increases the importance and domestic
impact of foreign policy and, thus, the interest of domestic actors in influencing it,7 as the continuing
debate on globalization amply illustrates.8 Even a casual observer of political affairs could not fail to
notice that, for instance, the sale of German military equipment to Turkey cannot be fully understood if
the relationship between the Social Democrat and the Green parties, and even the internal struggles
among the Greens are ignored. Similarly for instance, the dialogue between Germany and the Czech
Republic on Germans displaced after World War II has, for a long time, been under the influence of
the Bavarian CSU government and subject to intensive and successful lobbying of organizations of
dispellees in Germany.
                                                                                                                                                                     
information - Domestic politics and international relations, 1997, 233, 252; Ashley, Richard K.: The poverty of
neorealism, in: Keohane, Robert O.: Neorealism and its critics, 1986, 255 (268ff.); including domestic politics
also Snyder, Glenn H.; Diesing, Paul: Conflict among nations - Bargaining, decision making, and system
structure in international crises, 1977, 74f., 479f.
4 Cf. for this line of arguments Waltz (n. 3), p. 65.
5 Cf. Waltz (n. 3), 66ff.
6 Thus the very harsh criticism by Ashley (n. 3), 270 ("the state-as-actor assumption is a metaphysical
commitment prior to science and exempted from scientific criticism. [...] neorealism immunizes its statist
commitments from any form of falsification"); from a lawyer's point of view cf. also Fastenrath (n. 2), 11ff.
7 Cf. eg. Wolfrum (n. 1), 43.
8 On the reverse influence of internationalization on domestic politics cf. the contributions in Keohane, Robert
O.; Milner, Helen V. (eds.): Internationalization and domestic politics, 1996.
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This rather intuitive perception about the relevance of actors below the State level is confirmed by
more recent in-depth case studies. Milner has analyzed important negotiations that took place in the
1940's and 1950's, e.g. on the Bretton Woods Monetary Agreement or the European Defense
Community, as well as the much more recent negotiations on the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the Maastricht Treaty on European Monetary Union.9 All studies show that domestic
politics influence international relations, rendering cooperation more difficult and affecting the terms of
international agreements, and that failure to consider them will make it impossible to understand the
provisions of such agreements. As a result, Milner was able to identify the structure of domestic
preferences, the nature of domestic political institutions, and the distribution of information internally as
the three factors that condition a State's ability to cooperate.10 To look at international relations while
ignoring the inside of States would, as she points out, be like studying human emotions while ignoring
the genetic makeup and the biochemical system.11
III. Reality vs. modeling: an interdisciplinary problem
The argument in favor of the unitary actor assumption rests on two pillars. Even though the
assumption must be rejected in its result, both pillars retain their value.
Firstly, the importance of factors that cannot be attributed to the actors individually but to the system
as a whole is stressed.12 When States are assumed to be heterogeneous rather than unitary actors,
however, the influence of the international system on the results of, for instance, negotiations is not
denied. To dissect the State actor adds factors to the picture, it does neither necessarily subtract other
factors13 nor necessarily leave the scholar exclusively at the unit level or lower.14
Secondly, and more important in an interdisciplinary context, the unitary actor assumption deplores
the infinite proliferation of variables.15 Dividing the State actor into a set of internal actors with their
own preferences, agendas and restrictions will indeed and by definition add to the number of variables
that must be taken into account. The exact number of factors will depend on the national system as
well as on the model used. It remains unclear, however, why that number should be infinite. Refusing
the unitary actor assumption opens the door for internal actors, it does not determine how many of
them are allowed to pass through. Still, there will undeniably be proliferation. The question why such
proliferation is to be deplored is at the basis of many initial misunderstandings in interdisciplinary
research involving social scientists on the one hand, and lawyers on the other hand.
                                                     
9 Milner (n. 3), 135ff.
10 Milner (n. 3), 234.
11 Milner (n. 3), 255.
12 Waltz (n. 3), 65f.
13 Cf. Morrow, James D.: Electoral and congressional incentives and arms control, Journal of Conflict Resolution
35 (1991), 245 (248) in the context of arms control ("Domestic politics forms a part of the story, one that has
been underplayed until now. But the development of bargaining positions also depends upon the logic of [...]
interests within the executive branch, and dynamics of the negotiantions"); Snyder/Diesing (n. 3), 479f.;
probably similar Milner (n. 3), 255 ("if one rejects the notion of a unitary state, one can still study systems").
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Most lawyers, by professional training and professionally ingrained bias, endeavor to get a full grasp
on reality. When solving a case or supporting a client, they must strive to gather the most complete
information possible about the facts involved in order to be able to render a correct legal analysis. Of
course, not all facts are important. If, for instance, a person claims damages because his car's
automatic transmission has not been repaired correctly, the color of the car as well as age and sex of
the holder will evidently be of no influence. Conversely, if that person demands a building permit for a
garage, the fact that his car will not leave the garage for some time because its automatic
transmission does not function lacks any import. It is, therefore, not unknown to the lawyer to reduce
reality by consciously ignoring many facts that are not pertinent to the applicable legal rules.16
Nevertheless, the lawyer would never allow himself to ignore any factor revealing any factual influence
on the legal matter under consideration. In the claim for damages, any factor that might have
influenced the performance of the automatic transmission, or might shed any light on the question why
it did not work properly after the repair had taken place, would have to be carefully explored and
considered. When dealing with complicated causal relationships, lawyers tend to demand in-depth
expertises by specialists and expect them to conclusively explain what happened, and how. They want
neither simplifications nor generalizations.
Social scientist often prefer a completely different approach. They do not try to describe reality, but
rather to model it. Such models will often work with simplifying assumptions which, to the outside
observer, border on the ridiculous. It is not their objective, however, to correctly reflect reality, but to
explain and, hopefully, predict certain results. If the model, using certain assumptions and a limited
number of variables, manages to explain with a sufficient degree of plausibility why inflation rose, why
juvenile crimes went down, or why certain negotiations failed, then the model can be considered a
success. The model must, therefore, be workable. Any theory of international relations that uses too
many variables - let alone an infinite amount - would loose its workability. It might be a correct model
judged by its closeness to reality, but it is not a good one.
When proponents of the unitary actor assumption argue that it keeps down the number of variables
which need to be taken into consideration, they rely on this aspect of workability. In principle, this
argument is a cogent one. Yet its significance depends on the remaining explanatory power of such a
workable, but much reduced model. Here, a number of case studies in international relations,
especially those by Milner, have shown that more than one actor on the State level influences the
conduct and result of foreign affairs so that such conduct and results cannot be disregarded without
loosing the possibility to correctly explain the behavior of States in the international sphere.17 The
explanatory power of the unitary actor model has, thus, been sufficiently undermined to loose its
                                                                                                                                                                     
14 This, however, is maintained by Waltz (n. 3), 66.
15 Waltz (n. 3), 65.
16 Cf. e.g. Kischel, Uwe: Systembindung des Gesetzgebers und Gleichheitssatz, AöR 124 (1999), 174 (184).
17 Cf. Milner (n. 3), 135ff., 256ff.; Morrow (n. 13), 245, 248ff.; Miller, Steven E.: Politics over promise: Domestic
impediments to arms control, International Security 8 (1984), 67 (68ff.); further examples in Snyder/Diesing (n.
3), 74f., 340ff., 510ff.; cf. also Wolfrum, Rüdiger: Vorbereitende Willensbildung und Entscheidungsprozeß
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restrictive power in the analysis of international relations in general and international negotiations in
particular.
Apart from its decreasing appeal in international relations theory, the unitary actor assumption is not fit
to be transferred to legal analysis. It is an integral part of the modeling approach that is not used in
law. Legal science does not model, but tries to analyze the law as it is, or as it should be, describing
underlying principles and methods. No entity whose acts can have legal consequences may be left out
of legal analysis. One might be tempted to liken the traditional view that States, and not their sub-
units, are subjects of public international law, to the unitary actor assumption. However, this traditional
view is not part of a model trying to restrict variables. It is simply a consequence of the legal view that
States, and not their sub-units, have rights and duties under international law. The actions of sub-units
such as courts or legislatures are by no means left out of the picture. Rather, their actions are
attributed to the State as a whole. The State acts through its organs. Furthermore, in modern
international law, actors below the State level such as the individuals and corporations18 or non-
governmental organizations19 have attracted increasing attention by legal scholars, and are often
regarded as subjects of international law in their own right. The legal analysis of negotiations, in
particular, does not ignore these others actors.20 Finally, when the focus is shifted from public
international law to national public law, the different branches of government and the distribution of
foreign affairs powers among them becomes a dominant theme.
IV. Political and legal actors
The different actors that compose the State may be analyzed from a political or - as here - from a legal
point of view. As a working definition, an actor is a legal one if and insofar as he has the capability to
perform acts that will have legally binding force - pass a bill, render a judgement, produce rules or
regulations -, or if and insofar as his participation in such acts is subject to legal rules - parliamentary
fractions participating in the preparation and debate of bills, groups with a right to be heard in
administrative proceedings, individual judges in court chambers. From a political point of view, further
actors will have to be added who may have a factual, but no legal influence - e.g. by means of
lobbyism in parliament, peer pressure on judges, or bureaucratic inertia in administrative action.
The legal quality of an actor is not fixed, but will depend on the context. Political parties, for instance,
have no legal, but only political influence on foreign affairs, whereas in the conduct of elections, they
                                                                                                                                                                     
beim Abschluß multilateraler völkerrechtlicher Verträge, IINS Research Paper No. 3, Arbeitspapiere -
Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung Nr. 17, 2000, 3, 7.
18 Cf. Malanczuk, Peter: Akehurst's modern introduction to international law, 7th ed. 1997, 100ff.; Kischel, Uwe:
State Contracts - Völker-, schieds- und internationalprivatrechtliche Aspekte des anwendbaren Rechts, 1992,
234ff.; Epping, Volker, in: Ipsen, Knut: Völkerrecht, 4th ed. 1999, 79ff., 14f.; on group rights cf. Riedel, Eibe:
Gruppenrechte und kollektive Aspekte individueller Menschenrechte, BerDGV 33 (1994), 49 (59ff.).
19 Cf. Malanczuk (n. 18), 96ff.; Stoecker, Felix William: NGOs und die UNO - Die Einbindung von
Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NGOs) in die Strukturen der Vereinten Nationen, 2000, passim, esp. 89ff.
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are a constitutionally recognized factor.21 Employers and workers, as groups, do not legally participate
in the conduct of a State's foreign affairs, while they are represented and have voting rights in the
negotiation of new conventions and recommendations within the framework of the International Labor
Organization.22 In a political analysis of the negotiation process leading towards the Maastricht treaty
with its provisions on European Monetary Union, the German Bundesbank must be considered a key
player. Bundesbank endorsement was necessary for the executive to obtain legislative approval, and
the critical point of view of the reserve bank significantly changed the negotiations.23 Legally, however,
the Bundesbank had no influence at all. While, at the time, it was a key legal actor in German
monetary policy, any participation in the negotiation and ratification of a treaty on European integration
that transferred much of its power to a European Central Bank was outside the sphere of its
competence. Thus, in the proceedings on the Maastricht treaty with its provisions on European
Monetary Union before the German Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundesbank was not even
among the entities that had a legal right to be heard. The Court only invited Prof. Schlesinger, the
president, and Dr. Rieke, one director of the Bundesbank as informal "informers"
("Auskunftspersonen") on questions of Monetary Union.24
The legal analysis of international negotiations aimed at the conclusion of an international agreement
will have to consider the traditional horizontal25 division of the State under the separation of powers
doctrine into legislative, executive, and judiciary branch.26 Of these powers, the second is most
prominent in negotiations. Neither parliament nor the courts, but the executive will talk with foreign
governments, send representatives, and perform the day-to-day business of negotiation.27 When the
state is treated as a unitary actor, it will most often be identified with the executive. The legislative
branch with its important power to ratify has also been subject to much legal analysis, with foreign
affairs being frequently regarded as a joint function of parliament and the executive.28 This study,
however, will focus on the role of the third branch of government, the judiciary, trying to point out some
major functions of courts in international negotiations.
                                                                                                                                                                     
20 Cf. e.g. Wolfrum (n. 17), 3, 7; for an economic analysis cf. e.g. Boockmann, Bernhard: Decision-Making on
ILO Conventions and Recommendations: Legal Framework and Application, IINS Research Paper No. 2,
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung - Dokumentation Nr. 00-03, 2000, 23f.
21 Cf. Ipsen, Jörn, in: Sachs, Michael: Grundgesetz Kommentar, 2nd ed. 1999, Art. 21, marg. note 22, 34f., 42,
57ff.
22 Boockmann (n. 20), 4f., 25.
23 Cf. Milner (n. 3), 218f., 221f., 225.
24 BVerfGE 89, 155 (170f.); cf. also the decision on entry into the third stage of EMU BVerfGE 97, 350 (367),
where the Bundesbank is not even mentioned.
25 Aspects of vertical separation of powers, especially Länder and Bundesrat, of intra-ministerial cooperation,
and of regional as well as local participation will not be addressed here; cf. e.g. on the role of the Länder
Fastenrath (n. 2), 115ff.
26 Cf. Fastenrath (n. 2), 54.
27 On the more theoretical than practical role of the president according to Art. 59 para. 1 Grundgesetz see
Pernice, Ingolf, in: Dreier, Horst: Grundgesetz Kommentar, vol. 2, 1998, Art. 59, marg. note 18ff.; Bernhardt
(n. 2), marg. note 7f.; Fastenrath (n. 2), 199ff.; Seidel, Dietmar: Der Bundespräsident als Träger der
auswärtigen Gewalt, 1972, 43ff.
28 Cf. supra n. 1.
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C. International negotiations and the judiciary
Negotiations aiming at the conclusion of an international agreement do not take place in a national
legal void. International agreements in Germany are not the supreme law of the land. In the hierarchy
of norms, they rather fall between ordinary statutes and constitutional law.29 Consequently, an
international agreement must conform with the German constitution (Grundgesetz; GG).30 The results
of the negotiation will have to be ratified and, thus, become subject to judicial scrutiny.31
In discussions, practitioners reveal that negotiators not infrequently enjoy a surprising amount of
leeway from their respective governments, especially in bargaining over multilateral codifications. In
such cases, the agent will experience little if any constraint from his principal. But even without
concrete instructions, he will be directed by the demands of constitutional law, which in that sense
serves as a principal of final resort. For example, the constitutional mandate of unification in the
preamble of the Grundgesetz for decades compelled all West German representatives dealing with
officials of the GDR to consider the prospects of unification in all negotiations. The right way to choose
may have been open to discussion in many situation, but the goal as such could never be discarded.32
The State's representatives at the negotiation table have to bear such constitutional constraints in
mind. The most basic decision in any international negotiation - the decision what national interests
are - is not left exclusively to the executive but may also be predetermined by the national legal order
and is, consequently, subject to judicial interference.
I. International negotiations and constitutional guarantees: The theory of
approximation
The vital question, of course, concerns the content of the constitutional guarantees that constrain
international negotiations. Since the constitution ranks higher than international agreements, prima
facie all of its guarantees must be fully respected. In principle, there would then be no difference
between the constitutional constraints on a national statute and those on an international agreement
that will be applied in the national jurisdiction: neither one is dispensed from constitutional demands.
Indeed, this is a starting point for court decisions and scholarly opinions.33 Beyond its value as a
                                                     
29 Cf. Geiger, Geiger, Rudolf: Grundgesetz und Völkerrecht - Die Bezüge des Staatsrechts zum Völkerrecht und
Europarecht, 2nd ed. 1994, 177; on the status of low-level administrative agreements that are not explored
here cf. Schweitzer, Michael: Staatsrecht III, 5th ed. 1995, marg. note 463f.; Streinz, Rudolf, in: Sachs,
Michael: Grundgesetz Kommentar, 2nd ed. 1999, Art. 59 marg. note 81.
30 BVerfGE 1, 36 (14).
31 Cf. BVerfGE 36, 1 (13); 72, 66 (74f.); 72, 200 (238); 84, 90 (113); cf. Geiger (n. 29), 153; Schlaich, Klaus: Das
Bundesverfassungsgericht - Stellung, Verfahren, Entscheidungen, 4th ed. 1997, 90, 100, 138.
32 BVerfGE 36, 1 ( 17f.).
33 Cf. Geiger (n. 29), 148ff.; Bernhardt, Rudolf: Bundesverfassungsgericht und völkerrechtliche Verträge, in:
Bundesverfassungsgericht und Grundgesetz, Festgabe aus Anlaß des 25jährigen Bestehens des
Bundesverfassungsgericht, vol. 2, 1976, 154 (183); Hailbronner (n. 1), 15; Bleckmann, Albert: Grundgesetz
und Völkerrecht, 1975, 227ff.; Schweitzer (n. 29), 228; Stern, Klaus: Außenpolitischer Gestaltungsspielraum
und verfassungsgerichtliche Kontrolle - Das Bundesverfassungsgericht im Spannungsfeld zwischen Judicial
Activism und Judicial Restraint, NWVBl 1994, 241, 245ff.; Schröcker: Das vertragswidrige Gesetz (Zweiter
Teil), DVBl 1958, 410 (413f.); Schröder, Meinhard: Zur Wirkkraft der Grundrechte bei Sachverhalten mit
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starting point, however, this principle does not take sufficient notice of the specific structure of
international negotiations. Unlike the national legislature that decides alone, without outside
interference, and is solely responsible for all of its legal acts, an international agreement is the result of
intensive bargaining, of give and take, compromises, and package deals with other actors that are not
subject to the German constitution. The outcome of such negotiations cannot be expected to conform
totally with the German position, be it a political or a constitutional one. To be unable to compromise in
certain areas might seriously hamper Germany's bargaining position.34 On the other hand,
constitutionally guaranteed freedom and equality rights should, by their nature, not be allowed to be
bargained away. They are rights that are so important that even the sovereign power of the national
legislature cannot abrogate them.35 The German Federal Constitutional Court, far from being ignorant
of this dilemma, has developed the so-called theory of approximation ("Annäherungstheorie")36 to
balance these conflicting interests.
1. Background
The theory of approximation allows, under certain circumstances, the German State to negotiate and
conclude international agreements that, as purely national laws, would not pass constitutional
muster.37 The Federal Constitutional Court developed this theory when deciding upon the
constitutionality of the Saar Statute,38 a decision that merits closer attention.39
In the aftermath of World War II, the Saar territory became part of the French occupation zone.
Quickly, France successfully began efforts to detach the territory from Germany. These efforts
accumulated in the Saar Constitution of December 1947, which gave the Saar an autonomous status,
independent of Germany, and envisaged close economic ties with France. Compliance with the
Constitution was to be supervised by a French High Commissioner with extensive powers.
Subsequent agreements further strengthened this autonomy. The German government did not
recognize the new regime for the Saar territory, particularly since political parties advocating closer
ties to Germany had been systematically hampered or even banned. In 1954, Germany and France
signed an agreement on the Saar Statute, which was intended to give the Saar territory a specific
European status under the supervision of a European Commissioner responsible only to the Council
of Ministers of the Western European Union. This Saar statute was subject to a public referendum
                                                                                                                                                                     
grenzüberschreitenden Elementen, Festschrift Schlochauer, 1981, 137 (138); BVerfGE 4, 157 (169) (speaking
of the undeniable constitutional principle that any exercise of state power in the Federal Republic of Germany
is bound by the Grundgesetz); on the applicability of the basic rights contained in the Grundgesetz to
situations with transboundary elements cf. critically Hofmann, Rainer: Grundrechte und grenzüberschreitende
Sachverhalte, 1994, 10ff.
34 Cf. also BVerfGE 77, 170 (231) (to create a danger of incapacity to act on foreign policy matters cannot be the
meaning of the constitution).
35 Alexy, Robert: Theorie der Grundrechte, 1986, 406.
36 The notion seems to have been first used by Schröcker (n. 33), 414.
37 Clearly Zeitler, Franz-Christoph: Verfassungsgericht und völkerrechtlicher Vertrag - Die gerichtliche Kontrolle
völkerrechtlicher Akte der Regierung nach deutschem, amerikanischem und englischem Verfassungsrecht,
1974, 267f.
38 Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Regierung der Französischen
Republik über das Statut der Saar of March 24th, 1955, BGBl 1955 II, 295.
39 BVerfGE 4, 157.
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(which finally failed and thus lead to the return of the Saar territory as a German Land), and was to last
until the conclusion of a peace treaty.40 The treaty was challenged in the Federal Constitutional Court
by 178 members of the German Bundestag, and upheld.
The Federal Constitution Court pointed out that in constitutional scrutiny of an international treaty
which regulates Germany's political relations, it must not loose sight of the political position from which
the treaty has arisen and of the political realities it seeks to shape or alter. This is particularly important
when the political starting position has been created by the other party of the treaty under its special
prerogatives as an occupying power which are not subject to constitutional constraints. The question
then followed, whether the basic constitutional principle that any exercise of State authority in
Germany is bound by the Grundgesetz could be extended to treaties negotiated under such
conditions, so that only treaties which conform completely with the provisions of the Grundgesetz
could be accepted as constitutional.41 The Court answered in the negative: The provisions of the treaty
only need to show an inherent tendency, and need to have been undertaken with the will to come
closer to the fully constitutional status, to prepare such a status at least as much as is politically
attainable.42 This principle leads to the conclusion that, for a transition period, infringements of
constitutional norms can be accepted if they have a direct link with the provisions showing such a
tendency of approximation towards full compliance with the constitution, and as long as some core
contents of constitutional provisions are observed. To rule otherwise would lead to an undesirable
constitutional rigorism, impeding the bad to give way to the better because the best cannot be
attained.43
2. The constitutional influence of the negotiation starting position
The theory of approximation turns the negotiation starting position into a constitutionally relevant
factor. When, by constitutional standards, the situation is worse without than with the new international
agreement, then the government may conclude that agreement, even if its provisions do not conform
with the constitution. Constitutional law thus respects the special situation of international negotiations,
in which the government is not alone and cannot be expected to always attain full recognition of its
own position. But constitutional law also gives specific directions to negotiating agents. They must at
least try to come closer to the constitutional status, and this undertaking must be reflected in the
provisions of the agreement.
a. Improvement of the starting position
The theory of approximation does not, however, generally exempt the government from constitutional
guarantees when negotiating international agreements. Its main restriction, of course, is the
requirement for the situation prior to the agreement to be less in conformity with the Grundgesetz. This
                                                     
40 BVerfGE 4, 157 (158ff.)
41 BVerfGE 4, 157 (168f.).
42 BVerfGE 4, 157 (169).
43 BVerfGE 4, 157 (170).
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does not necessarily require each and every single provision of the treaty to constitute an
improvement or at least no change for the worse. When, for instance, the government in an
agreement renounces certain debated rights of their citizens, this deterioration may be set off by a
pronounced overall improvement of the legal situation.44 This does not mean that any provision that
severely encroaches upon constitutional rights can be justified by just any overall tendency of the
agreement to promote such constitutional goals as peace and social justice. Not only would such
extremes be prevented by a reasonable weighing of the positive and negative effects in determining
the existence of an overall improvement,45 but also by the requirement of a direct link between the
constitutional infringement and the overall improvement.46
b. Provisional nature of the agreement?
Other restrictions play a less clear role. Thus, in its early decisions, the Court required the not-quite-
constitutional arrangement to be of provisional, interim nature.47 In its actual application, this restriction
on negotiating agents never carried very far, as even rather open periods of time such as "until the
conclusion of a peace treaty" were accepted to be sufficiently provisional in the legal sense.48
Apart from its limited scope, the provisionality requirement never made much sense. If the government
is allowed to agree to a politically attainable amelioration even if it does not go all the way to
constitutionality, there is no reason to exclude agreements on a final new status without a time limit, if
such a final status is the best solution attainable through negotiation.49 Furthermore, the fact that a
status is legally without a time limit does not enjoin the government politically from trying to renegotiate
the agreement later in order to come even closer to the constitutionally proscribed position.
Consequently, the Federal Constitutional Court has, in later decisions, tacitly given up the
provisionality requirement when it agreed to a final renunciation of certain rights,50 or when it accepted
provisions without interim character.51
                                                     
44 Cf. BVerfGE 27, 253 (282).
45 On this weighing see Lerche, Peter: Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und die Vorstellung der "Annäherung" an
den verfassungsgewollten Zustand, DÖV 1971, 721 (723f.); Zeitler (n. 37), 281ff.
46 Cf. on this link BVerfGE 4, 157 (170); 12, 281 (286); Lerche (n. 45), 725; Zeitler (n. 37), 297f.; critically on
weighing and direct link Engel, Christoph: Völkerrecht als Tatbestandsmerkmal deutscher Normen, 1989,
168f., who argues that the unconstitutional clause must promote the same interest that is infringed, ibid., 169;
one might, indeed, have to bear in mind that the requirement of some "directness" is often no more than the
expression of an embarrassing lack of clarity on what one actually wants to say, cf. Nipperdey, Hans Carl:
Tatbestandsaufbau und Systematik der deliktischen Grundtatbestände, NJW 1967, 1985 (1990).
47 BVerfGE 4, 157 (169, 170); cf. also BVerfGE 12, 281 (290ff.); 15, 337 (349f.); 18, 353 (366); agreeing
Hailbronner (n. 1) 29.
48 Cf. BVerfGE 4, 157 (175); Lerche (n. 45), 722.
49 Lerche (n. 45), 722; agreeing Engel (n. 46), 169; Tomuschat, Christian: Auswärtige Gewalt und
verfassungsgerichtliche Kontrolle - Einige Bemerkungen zum Verfahren über den Grundvertrag, DÖV 1973,
801 (805 n. 29); cf. also Zeitler (n. 37), 292f., 295f. (relation between interim character and degree of
approximation).
50 BVerfGE 27, 253 (282); 41, 126 (167).
51 BVerfGE 95, 39 (46f.).
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c. Absolute limits
As a further restriction, the Court sometimes mentioned that the international agreement may not
infringe upon indispensable basic principles of the constitution and, as an example, cites the principles
referred to in art. 79 para. 3 and in art. 19 para. 2 of the Grundgesetz.52 While the example of art. 79
para. 3 GG, which designates those parts of the constitution that are not subject to constitutional
amendment even by the required 2/3-majority, is sufficiently clear, the exact meaning of art. 19 para. 2
GG, which protects the core content of the basic rights from any infringement, is highly debated. A
majority of jurists largely identify this provision with the principle of proportionality,53 which does not
seem to be what the Court had in mind here. What other principles beyond these examples the Court
might have thought about is open to debate. Even though the restriction for indispensable basic
principles has never found any application, it can well be seen as a security valve for major and
unacceptable infringements on basic constitutional guarantees.
One might wonder why the basic rationale of the theory of approximation should not apply here.
Indeed, why should even a profoundly unconstitutional agreement not be accepted if the situation
without that agreement is even worse? Leaving aside the fact that imagination would have to be
strained to find a practical example, it must be borne in mind that the starting position, the pre-
agreement status, here, is a situation for which the State under the Grundgesetz is not responsible. If
it were otherwise, especially if the starting position was defined by another treaty concluded by the
Federal Republic of Germany, then this starting position could itself be challenged on constitutional
grounds. By negotiating and ratifying a new agreement, however, the situation receives the State's
seal of approval. To let the State carry out an agreement that contravenes the core of its constitutional
beliefs, cannot be accepted, even if the situation without the agreement - but also without the State's
consent - is still less acceptable. There are, in other words, absolute limits to what the government can
do even for the factual good of its people. A positive overall effect cannot outweigh the betrayal of our
most basic convictions.54
3. Utilization for all agreements
The theory of approximation has been developed and applied in the context of Germany's occupation
after World War II and the successive reduction of its negative legal effects. Consequently, it has been
argued that only these special historic circumstances made it possible to allow the German
government to disregard constitutional provisions for the sake of improving the overall situation.55
                                                     
52 BVerfGE 4, 157 (170); 15, 337 (349); not mentioned in BVerfGE 95, 39 (46ff.).
53 Cf. e.g. Dreier, Horst, in: Dreier, Horst: Grundgesetz Kommentar, vol. 2, 1998, Art. 19 para. 2, marg. note
11ff.; on the somewhat similar problem of Art. 19 para. 2 GG in the context of delegation of sovereign power to
the EU cf. Kischel, Uwe: Der unabdingbare grundrechtliche Mindeststandard in der Europäischen Union - Zur
Auslegung des Art. 23 Abs. 1 S. 1 GG, forthcoming in: Der Staat, part X.
54 Contra Zeitler (n. 37), 296f.; cf. however Lerche (n. 45), 724 (speaking of a hardly problematic limit of absolute
basic principles).
55 Cf. Schröder (n. 33), 145; the specific political and historical background is also stressed by Cronauer, Harald:
Der internationale Vertrag im Spannungsfeld zwischen Verfassung und Völkerrecht, 1986, 9f., but cf. ibid., 20;
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Along these lines, the Federal Constitutional Court, in its most recent decision on the subject,
summarized the theory of approximation as pertaining to political agreements which gradually reduce
an occupational legal order.56 If this were true, approximation would not only have had an extremely
limited field of application in the past. Since Germany has regained its full sovereignty and all
remnants of the occupational status have been completely ended under Art. 7 of the Treaty on the
Final Settlement with respect to Germany of September 12th, 199057, this field of application would
also, by now, have vanished completely. The theory of approximation would be no more than a
fleeting episode in the aftermath of the war.
The rationale of approximation, however, is completely independent of the specifics of occupational
law. When deciding upon the validity of a treaty under domestic constitutional law, the Court should
never loose sight of the political position from which the treaty has arisen and of the political realities it
seeks to shape or alter. That in international negotiations Germany may not always be able to push its
own - constitutional - position through completely, and that the negotiation starting position might be
worse than the resulting agreement, are factors that must be taken into account whether an
occupational order is taken back or not. When, for instance, the property of German citizens is
expropriated by a foreign State and that State is permanently unwilling to pay any compensation at
all,58 the German government may be able to negotiate a lump sum agreement. Even if this
compensation is far below full market value,59 the overall situation has improved significantly and
should not be allowed to be challenged on constitutional grounds.60 Similarly, German property owners
who live close to the border and wish to sue a neighboring State for transboundary emissions may
have the necessary standing in German courts but may not be able to enforce any judgement in their
favor in the foreign state. If the German government manages to negotiate a treaty that abolishes
standing in Germany, but gives Germans the full rights to sue the foreign government in the foreign
courts and to enforce any judgement of such courts, this overall improvement should not be hampered
by possible constitutional doubts as to the removal of standing in Germany.61 There is no reason to
distinguish such cases from those on occupational law. Simply, occupational law provides the most
ready example of a country existing under an unconstitutional legal situation that it has not brought
about itself and that cannot be altered by unilateral actions, but only through international negotiations.
The theory of approximation is, therefore, applicable to any situation where constitutionally protected
                                                                                                                                                                     
Schuppert (n. 1), 96.; cf. also Stern (n. 33), 249, stating that the theory of approximation might have lost much
of its relevance.
56 BVerfGE 95, 39 (46).
57 BGBl 1990 II, 1317.
58 On the question if compensation is still required under rules of public international law cf. Kischel (n. 18),
308ff.
59 On the determination of compensation in international law cf. Schäfer, Martin: Entschädigungsstandard und
Unternehmensbewertung bei Enteigungen im allgemeinen Völkerrecht, 1997, 151ff.
60 Cf. for this example Bernhardt, Rudolf: Verfassungsrecht und internationale Lagen, DÖV 1977, 457 (460).
61 Cf. for this example Engel (n. 46), 169f.; for a further example cf. ibid., 173 note 777.
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interests can be realized only partially, for reasons that are beyond the exclusive control of the
German government.62
This position is not only shared by many authors, but seems to underlie the most recent decision of
the Federal Constitutional Court as well. The Court pays lip service to the restriction of approximation
to occupational law, maintaining that limiting provisions of international agreements on the
participation of civilian NATO personnel in hiring other personnel meet the requirements of this
restriction.63 Nevertheless, the Court could not fail to notice that more than 40 years have passed
since Germany was under occupational rule and that it has by now regained complete sovereignty.
This, it however argues, does not influence the applicability of the theory of approximation. For
German membership in NATO is an essential part of German foreign policy. When negotiating NATO
agreements, the Federal Republic is, therefore, subject to foreign policy demands, which do not
warrant any other constitutional evaluation than that applied to German negotiations on reducing its
occupational status.64 The Federal Constitutional Court has thus accepted the application of the theory
of approximation to situations with a negotiation starting position that is equivalent, but not identical to
that of reducing an occupational status.
II. Margin of appreciation
When applying the theory of approximation to a concrete case, a problem will quickly appear that
transgresses approximation and pervades judicial scrutiny of foreign politics in general and of
international agreements in particular: Who decides whether the government, in the negotiation
process, has come as close to the fully constitutional status as is politically attainable?65 Who decides
how great the risk of Soviet counter-measures was when medium-range missiles were deployed in
West Germany? Who decides on the feasibility of hard of soft negotiation tactics? In the abstract: Who
decides on the evaluation of the factual situation, of possible political action, of future consequences,
and of the foreign policy decisions taken on this basis?66
1. Necessity of a margin of appreciation
To leave this decision to the courts would conform with their accepted role in judicial review of
legislative and executive action. However, even in a purely domestic context, legislature and executive
                                                     
62 Cf. Engel (n. 46), 171; Hailbronner (n. 1), 28f.; Ress, Georg: Wechselwirkung zwischen Völkerrecht und
Verfassung bei der Auslegung völkerrechtlicher Verträge, BerDGV 23 (1982), 7 (47); Bernhardt (n. 60), 460;
Bernhardt (n. 33), 183; Geiger (n. 29), 152; Zeitler (n. 37), 263; Schuppert (n. 1), 99; ; Lerche (n. 45), 721ff.;
Eibach, Gerhard: Das Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften als Prüfungsgegenstand des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 1986, 79.
63 BVerfGE 95, 39 (46).
64 BVerfGE 95, 39 (46f.), emphasis added.
65 On this requirement BVerfGE 4, 157 (169).
66 Cf. for this framing of the question Hailbronner (n. 1) 20.
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are given a certain margin of appreciation.67 In the international context, the need for such leeway
multiplies. Not only would the judges on the court often lack the specific knowledge of the situation.
They would have to enter into long evidentiary stages that might not be politically wise, while their
results would not necessarily be more dependable than the evaluation by the executive. Even more
important, the assessment of what is attainable, what can be done, and what possible consequences
are to be taken into account depends intensively on the momentary situation of the negotiators.
Negotiations are no mathematical equations, subject to pure logic, where given facts lead to a
determined solution.68 Negotiators need a sense of atmosphere, must be able to read hidden signs
and polite hints, acting on such insights without always being completely sure on the factual
background. If it were otherwise, any intelligent expert on a given issue would necessarily be a good
negotiator - and special training on negotiating techniques be entirely useless. Sometimes, a good
negotiator must seize the moment to come to an agreement that otherwise might never be reached.
None of these factors leads itself to judicial inquiry.
The Federal Constitutional Court has accepted the realities of international relations and gives a wide
margin of appreciation to the executive in its determinations and prognoses in foreign affairs.69 The
Court argues that the executive has the necessary knowledge on the spot, carries the political
responsibility,70 and is not the only one to influence the result,71 that there are no judicially manageable
standards,72 that is is not the task of the Constitutional Court to replace non-legal evaluations of the
politically competent organs with its own evaluations,73 and that the executive may legitimately be
determined in the use of its latitude by political goal and values.74
2. Scope of the doctrine
Usually, the margin of appreciation doctrine will be applied in situations of doubt, where the factual
situation is not entirely clear or subject to different interpretations. Here, the court will not try to
determine the facts by judicial means, but rather rely on the executive's account. The doctrine,
however, carries further. In an early decision already, the Constitutional Court has been willing not
only to follow the executive's lead in a situation of doubt, but to abandon a view of facts it had already
assumed in an prior judgement, simply because the executive supplied a new point of view: Art. 1 of
the so-called Überleitungsvertrag75 (Transference Treaty) provided that German authorities were
                                                     
67 Cf. eg. Schulze-Fielitz, Helmuth, in: Dreier, Horst: Grundgesetz Kommentar, vol. 2, 1998, Art. 20
(Rechtsstaat), marg. note 178f.; Sachs, Michael, in: Sachs, Michael: Grundgesetz Kommentar, 2nd ed. 1999,
Art. 20, marg. note 115.
68 On some of the inner workings of negotiations cf. e.g. the remarks by Wolfrum (n. 17), 8f.
69 Cf. e.g. Schwarz, Henning: Die verfassungsgerichtliche Kontrolle der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik: Ein
Verfassungsvergleich Deutschland - USA, 1995, 205ff., 250ff.; Hailbronner (n. 1), 19ff.; Kokott (n. 2), 947f.;
Stern (n. 33), 249.
70 Cf. BVerfG (1st chamber of the Second Senate), NVwZ 1995, 81 (83).
71 BVerfGE 55, 349 (365).
72 BVerfGE 66, 39 (60f.).
73 BVerfGE 66, 39 (61).
74 BVerfGE 40, 141 (178f.); cf. for these reasons Hailbronner (n. 1), 19f.
75 Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and Occupation, of October 23rd, 1954, BGBl.
1955 II, 405.
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allowed to abolish or change most of occupation law, but that it remained valid until such abolition or
change. The Federal Constitutional Court concluded that the allied powers had no interest to insist
that German courts were prohibited from reviewing the constitutionality of occupational law or from
declaring it inapplicable in such cases. Art. 1 of the Überleitungsvertrag allowed Germany to abolish
nearly all occupational law on the day after the occupational regime ended, thus showing that the
allied powers had given up any interest in the continuing validity of occupation law.76 The federal
government, in its brief to the Court, had not provided any details on this issue.77 Two years later
however, in another case involving the Überleitungsvertrag, the federal government maintained that,
apart from legislative changes, no German authority was allowed to treat a provision of occupational
law as invalid. During the negotiation process in 1952, the executive explained, the allied powers had
insisted on such a rule despite German misgivings, because they were unwilling to accept that their
legislative acts were treated as unconstitutional and invalid.78 The Constitutional Court noted the
divergence but showed no hesitation to accept the government's version and, consequently, to change
part of its own legal reasoning without even mentioning the fact that the same government had not put
forward any such facts two years earlier.79
The leeway given to the executive in its appreciation of facts has shown its full power when the
Constitutional Court refused to reconsider the executive's point of view even in the face of far-reaching
new evidence. In the process of German reunification, the two German governments issued a Joint
Declaration according to which expropriations based on occupational law that took place in the
territory of the German Democratic Republic between 1945 and 1949 would not be rescinded, the
property not be returned. This declaration was later incorporated into Art. 41 para. 1 of the Unification
Treaty.80 Upon constitutional complaint by former owners of such property, the Federal Constitutional
Court upheld the treaty and based its decision, inter alia, upon the statement of the executive that the
German Democratic Republic as well as the Soviet Union had insisted on these terms and that the
Federal Government, according to its own discretion, had to agree in order to achieve German Unity.81
While complainants maintained that there was no statement, let alone proof, that the East German
and Soviet governments had been unyielding in their position,82 the Court explained that under the
circumstances described by the executive and by its representatives in the oral proceedings, the
federal government could assume that the chance of unification depended on the acceptance of the
provision concerning expropriations between 1945 and 1949. The appraisal of what could be achieved
in view of the negotiation position, was subject only to the independent assessment of the federal
government and not to judicial review.83
                                                     
76 BVerfGE 12, 281 (291).
77 Cf. BVerfGE 12, 281 (286f.).
78 BVerfGE 15, 337 (340).
79 Cf. BVerfGE 15, 337 (349).
80 Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik über die
Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands - Einigungsvertrag -, BGBl. 1990 II p. 889.
81 BVerfGE 84, 90 (127).
82 BVerfGE 84, 90 (106).
83 BVerfGE 84, 90 (128).
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Five years later, the Court decided again on these issues.84 Complainants provided a number of partly
new documents to show that the question of restitution had by no means been vital to unification. One
of the strongest arguments were two published interviews with Soviet president Gorbachev.
Gorbachev said that he had never insisted on non-restitution, that the question had never been part of
his talks with the German chancellor Kohl, but had only been discussed at lower levels. The
alternative non-restitution or failure of German unification had never existed.85 This position was
further supported by Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze who, in a different interview, denied that
Soviet agreement to German unification had depended on non-restitution. There were no pre-
conditions to unification. The topic had not been discussed either in Gorbachev's staff or in the foreign
ministry.86 In spite of this evidence, the Federal Constitutional Court refused to second-guess the
executive's assessment. It insisted on the broad margin of appreciation in foreign policy, particularly in
the conclusion of treaties, the contents of which cannot be determined unilaterally but depend on the
consent of the other negotiating parties.87 While the executive's discretion is not completely unlimited,
it only ends where the executive's assessments has to be regarded as transgressing the borders of its
duties. This, however, could only be the case where it should have been evident to the federal
government that it assumed the wrong preconditions. Thus, the Constitutional Court saw itself in no
condition to investigate whether the federal government had correctly grasped the objective
negotiation starting position and had achieved the best possible result. This held true also for the
question whether the federal government would have endangered the constitutionally binding goal of
German unification by an unyielding insistence on certain positions, and was therefore allowed to fall
behind such positions.88 Concerning the negotiation position of the Soviet Union, the assessment of
the German government did not have to be the only one possible, it simply needed some plausible
support in the negotiation documents.89 In view of the quite diverse contents of the material, the Court
considered these conditions to be fulfilled. Even the statements of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze
were considered to be open to different interpretation. The Soviet statements that there had not been
an alternative between non-restitution and failure of German unification could be seen to imply that
after the Joint Declaration on non-restitution, which was known to the Soviet government, there was
longer any need for such a provision signed by Soviet representatives.90
In sum, while this decision has found criticism,91 negotiators need not fear to be second-guessed by
German courts in their factual assessment of the negotiation starting position, the development and
the prospects of the negotiation process. The Constitutional Court has shown ample evidence that it is
aware of the intricacies and problems of international negotiation. In particular, the Court will take into
account that "objectively", i.e. to an outsider after negotiations have been concluded, the situation
                                                     
84 BVerfGE 94, 12.
85 BVerfGE 94, 12 (18f.).
86 BVerfGE 94, 12 (19f.).
87 Cf. also BVerfGE 55, 349 (365)
88 BVerfGE 94, 12 (35).
89 BVerfGE 94, 12 (40).
90 BVerfGE 94, 12 (43f.); cf. also BVerfG (1st chamber of the Second Senate), NJW 1997, 450 (450).
91 Cf. e.g. Kokott (n. 2), 947f.
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might not look the same as to an insider during the process, who might even act under time
constraints.92 Which of these two points of view is more correct and appropriate, would be next to
impossible to decide. While the ex post facto view might be closer to the true facts, it is not available to
the negotiators, who must work under conditions of partial insecurity. To let the ex post facto view
prevail would not entail any reproach of the negotiators,93 but it would seriously hamper their ability to
assess the constitutional validity of possible negotiation results, thus impairing their negotiation
position. Furthermore, it would destabilize the State's overall position in the international community,
since any change in the available information could reopen the way for constitutional challenges to
treaties already in force, potentially deteriorating that State's reputation as a reliable partner who will
faithfully fulfill his international obligations.
III. Limits to the delegation of power
Another legal limit on negotiations that agents need to observe comes into play when sovereign
powers are delegated to a supranational organization.94 The main, but not exclusive,95 field of
application of these restrictions has been the law of the European Union. The Federal Constitutional
Court in 1986 decided that art. 24 para. 1 GG does not permit to give up the identity of the German
constitutional order by breaking into its basic framework, i.e. into its constitutive structure. Part of this
essential structure that cannot be abandoned are the legal principles on which the basic rights
provisions of the Grundgesetz are based. In delegating sovereign powers, a protection of basic rights
that is essentially comparable to the protection under the Grundgesetz must, therefore, generally be
ensured.96 These restrictions have later been codified with respect to the European Union in art. 23
para. 1 GG, while Art. 24 para. 1 GG remains applicable to all other delegations. Art. 23 para. 1 GG
now provides that Germany participates in the development of the European Union, which is bound by
democratic, social, federal, and rule of law principles as well as by the principle of subsidiarity, and
which ensures a protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that of the Grundgesetz.
The exact scope of the restrictions of art. 23 and 24 GG is subject to intensive debate which cannot be
entered here in detail.97 Nevertheless, the constitution has, again, taken the inherent limits of
international negotiation into consideration. In an international context, Germany cannot expect to
have its constitutional point of view prevail in all respects. Therefore, there is a broad consensus today
- reflected in the wording of Art. 23 para. 1 s. 1 GG - that the constitutional standard that must be
                                                     
92 On time constraints cf. BVerfGE 94, 12 (37).
93 Cf. Kokott (n. 2), 947, favoring an ex post view.
94 On the term "supranational" cf. Streinz, Rudolf: Europarecht, 4th ed. 1999, 41f.
95 Cf. e.g. BVerfGE 58, 1 (28, 30f., 40f.).
96 BVerfGE 73, 339 (375f., 387); 89, 155 (174f.)
97 Citing only the basic literature on the topic would fill pages, cf. only the overview on the differents opinions by
Pernice (n. 27), Art. 23 marg. note 26ff., 47ff.; Scholz, Rupert, in: Maunz, Theodor; Dürig, Günter:
Grundgesetz Kommentar, loose-leaf, Art. 23, marg. note 13ff.; Randelzhofer, Albrecht, in: Maunz, Theodor;
Dürig, Günter: Grundgesetz Kommentar, lose-leaf, Art. 24 marg. note 68ff.; Streinz, Rudolf:
Bundesverfassungsgerichtlicher Grundrechtsschutz und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, 1989, 83ff.;
Kischel (n. 53), passim.
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fulfilled by a supranational power with a direct influence in Germany does not have to be exactly as
high as the constitutional requirements on the German government, especially regarding basic
rights.98 To put it bluntly, a supranational organization like the European Union may, within certain
highly debated limits, legally perform acts in Germany that the German government would not be
allowed to perform. Furthermore, the formal rules on constitutional amendments have been partly
modified in order to accommodate the needs of international negotiation and cooperation. Any transfer
of sovereign rights causes an infringement of and a change in constitutionally proscribed
competences, and must consequently be viewed as a material amendment to the constitution.99
Nevertheless, under art. 24 GG, such an amendment does not need the usual 2/3-majority envisaged
by art. 79 para. 2 GG. Rather, any statute passed with a simple majority will be sufficient.100 Only for
the European Union, the 2/3-majority has been reintroduced by art. 23 para.1 s. 3 GG.
In spite of these alleviations, agents must be aware of very specific and sometimes difficult
constitutional restrictions in any negotiation on the conclusion or amendment of a treaty on
supranational organizations. Coming within reach of such restrictions is likely to entail proceedings
before the Constitutional Court that might in themselves be considered an internal and external
political nuisance. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the restrictions have been breached, the
executive must face the possibility that the treaty will be invalidated nationally.
IV. Interpretation
Negotiators should also bear in mind that while the actual negotiation process is largely in the hand of
the executive, the application of the negotiation outcome, i.e. of a treaty, is largely subject to national
judicial influence. This influence will come to bear mainly in two situations. Firstly, when a court has to
deal with a claim of unconstitutionality, the validity of such a claim will depend on the exact meaning of
the treaty, which therefore has to be interpreted by the competent court. In these situations, the
interpretation by the court may even stop the treaty from ever entering into force. Unlike ordinary
statutes, treaties and the statutes transforming them into national law are subject to judicial scrutiny
even before they are formally executed by the German President and promulgated, thus allowing the
Constitutional Court to pass a decision in time to prevent its international ratification.101 Secondly,
there may be a dispute on the exact meaning of a treaty clause that has to be applied in a given case.
When conditions of justiciability and standing are fulfilled, courts may get to decide such a dispute.
Thus, a citizen might feel that he is exempted from taxation in Germany under a double taxation
convention, while the internal revenue service disagrees;102 a foreigner may feel he is protected under
                                                     
98 Cf. Kischel (n. 53), part II ff. with further references
99 BVerfGE 58, 1 (36).
100 Cf. Pernice (n. 27), Art. 24, marg. note 28.
101 Cf. BVerfGE 1, 396 (413); Ulsamer, Gerhard, in: Maunz, Theodor; Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Bruno; Klein, Franz;
Ulsamer Gerhard: Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, loose-leaf, § 76 marg. note 17.
102 Cf. BVerfGE 30, 272, where a provision of a double taxation treaty relating to progressive taxation was held to
be unconstitutional.
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the Convention relative to the Status of Refugees,103 while the competent national agency may wish to
expel him; or certain claims against a State may be non-justiciable under a treaty clause such as Art 5
para. 2 of the London Agreement on German External Debts of February 27th, 1953,104 while the
exact field of application of that clause is subject to doubt.105
1. Independence of judicial interpretation
When proposing and agreeing on the wording of each clause in an international agreement,
negotiators need to keep the interpretive powers of courts in mind. Otherwise, such clauses might in
practice be given a meaning which they were not intended to have. Thus, in spite of excellent
negotiation tactics, the negotiator might not get what he thought to have bargained for because of the
intervention of his own courts.106
National courts have, however, largely accepted that international agreements must be interpreted
according to international, not national rules of interpretation.107 Negotiators, therefore, do not have to
keep more than one system of interpretation in mind. The customary international law rules on
interpretation have largely been codified in Art. 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.108 These provisions have helped to clarify an old debate between those who saw
interpretation of a treaty as a means to discover the subjective intent of the parties, and those who see
the objective wording of the treaty as the determining factor. The basic provision of Art. 31 para. 1 of
the Convention - stipulating that a treaty shall be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning
of its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose - as well as Art. 32 - mentioning
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion only as supplementary
means of interpretation, to be used when the meaning would otherwise remain ambiguous or obscure,
or be manifestly absurd or unreasonable - make clear that the method of interpretation in international
law is primarily an objective, and not a subjective one.109 Consequently, negotiators cannot rely on
courts to establish the meaning of a given clause by trying to determine the real, subjective intent of
the parties during the negotiation process. Rather, any clause should - theoretically - be constructed in
a way to represent this intent of the parties as exactly as possible in its objective wording. Additionally,
in many countries including Germany, negotiators cannot rely on the courts feeling bound by an
interpretation provided by the executive branch, either. A court might ask the executive's opinion when
faced with an interpretative problem, but due to separation of powers considerations, the judicial
                                                     
103 BGBl 1953 II, 560.
104 BGBl 1953 II, 333.
105 Cf. BVerwGE 35, 262.
106 Cf. for the employment of a certain concept of interpretation proposed in the literature Fitzmaurice, Sir Gerald:
Vae victis or woe to the negotiators! Your treaty or our "interpretation of it?, AJIL 65 (1971), 358 (368) ("woe to
the negotiators (...). It would not be their treaty that would emerge from the fray, but another that someone
else thought was the one they should have entered into.") (italics in the original).
107 Cf. Schreuer, Christoph: Wechselwirkung zwischen Völkerrecht und Verfassung bei der Auslegung
völkerrechtlicher Verträge, BerDGV 23 (1982), 61 (66ff.); Ress (n. 62), 38f.; Hailbronner (n. 1), 25f.; Geiger (n.
29), 180; Cronauer (n. 55), 215f.
108 Cf. Verdross, Alfred; Simma, Bruno: Universelles Völkerrecht, 3rd ed. 1984, 491.
109 Cf. Heintschel von Heinegg, Wolff, in: Ipsen, Knut: Völkerrecht, 4th ed. 1999, 116f.; Verdross/Simma (n. 108),
491f.; Brownlie, Ian: Principles of public international law, 5th ed. 1998, p. 632.
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branch will decide independently, based on its own reasoning, and not feel bound by statements of
other branches.110
2. Ambiguity of terms
The ideal of clear and unambiguous treaty clauses that will minimize the possibility of judicial
interference, of course, is often not attainable in practice. Not only is the creation of clear legal norms
a well-known general problem. A norm that has reached any degree of abstraction will almost always
be open to interpretation. More importantly, in the international context, clear clauses may not be
feasible at all. For clear and unambiguous clauses require a clear an unambiguous common will of the
parties, a requirement that frequently is not met. Especially for highly political treaties, formula
compromises are a typical feature.111 Parties will sometimes openly agree to disagree, but more
frequently choose highly ambiguous words to cover up their dissent with diplomatic and legal
terminology. With formula compromises, a court that needs to provide an answer to the question at
hand will experience a lot of leeway in interpreting and applying the clause. There cannot be any
guarantee that the solution it finds will conform to the expectations or the negotiation position of its
respective executive.
A well-known example of such ambiguity is the principle of subsidiarity in Art. 5 para. 2 TEC,
according to which the Community shall take action only if and insofar as the objectives of the
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and can, therefore, by reason
of the scale or effects for the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. This principle is
and can be used either to achieve a high degree of decentralization, or to promote the growing of
community competences.112 The German Constitutional Court, in its decision on the constitutionality of
the Maastricht Treaty, took a view of the subsidiarity principle that was favorable to the protection of
national interests. The rather open wording of the principle did by no means prevent the Court from
choosing this specific - and quite plausible - interpretation. Quite on the contrary, it led it to include in
the judgement an additional supportive measure to strengthen its interpretation: Realizing that the
effectiveness of subsidiarity in countering the erosion of member states' competences as interpreted
by the Court depended on the practice of Council of Ministers, the justices declared that the German
federal government was constitutionally bound to use its influence in the Council in favor of a strict
application of subsidiarity.113
                                                     
110 Cf. e.g. Schreuer (n. 107), 63f.; Bleckmann (n. 33), 255f.
111 Hailbronner (n. 1), 26.
112 Cf. Zacker, Christian; Wernicke, Stephan: Examinatorium Europarecht, 1997, 105 (ideal for the crystallization
of different europolitical models); Beutler, Bengt; Bieber, Roland; Pipkorn, Jörn; Streil, Jochen: Die
Europäische Union, 4th ed. 1993, 85; Huber, Peter M.: Recht der Europäischen Integration, 1996, 152f.
113 BVerfGE 89, 155 (210f.). It may be added that the well-known need to decrease ambiguity has led the
member states to introduce into the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam a special protocol dealing with the application
of the principle of subsidiarity.
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3. Constitutional interpretation of agreements
The interpretive powers of courts with regard to international agreements may come as a special
surprise to negotiators when the interpretation is not based on international law principles only, but
determined by the demands of national constitutional law.
A claim of unconstitutionality will not always cover all possible interpretations of a certain treaty clause,
but will only be valid if certain interpretations are adopted. Now, the German Grundgesetz has often
been described as favorable to international law.114 In line with this tendency, the Federal
Constitutional Court will, when interpretation is still open and several possibilities present themselves,
prefer such interpretations that will prevent a verdict of unconstitutionality.115 Consequently, far-fetched
interpretations, even if they are unconstitutional, will never lead the Court to declare the respective
treaty unconstitutional.116
The constitutional interpretation (verfassungskonforme Auslegung) of treaties can be criticized since it
constitutes a deviation from the ordinarily required interpretation according to international law rules
only.117 Courts may be suspected to stop the process of interpretation early in order to achieve a
sufficient degree of ambiguity that will allow the constitutionally required interpretation to pass.118
Furthermore, one could doubt the very existence of such ambiguity, since without the constitutional
problem, courts would certainly neither leave the case undecided nor randomly choose a certain
interpretation, but rather arrive at a specific interpretation in application of international law rules.119
When purely national methods are allowed to influence interpretation, treaties can undesirably acquire
completely different meanings in different countries. True, such disagreements can appear without
national law influences, as well. If only international law rules are applied, however, States are capable
of discussing the question or use other methods of peaceful settlement because they agree on the
basis upon which the dispute is to be solved. The national law peculiar to one of the parties, on the
other hand, is not shared as a common basis. It invokes the danger of a dispute involving a difference
in basic principles, the solution of which will put much strain on the pragmatic capacities of the parties.
Consequently, a general distrust towards all national law influences on treaty interpretation is quite
appropriate.
Constitutional interpretation, however, is not a method that is incorporated into the original process of
interpretation. Rather, it is an add-on that will be applied after interpretation by international law
                                                     
114 Cf. eg. Tomuschat, Christian: Die staatsrechtliche Entscheidung für die internationale Offenheit, in: Isensee,
Josef; Kirchhof, Paul (eds.): Handbuch des Staatsrechts, vol. 7, 1992, § 172, marg. note 27ff.; Steinberger,
Helmut: Allgemeine Regeln des Völkerrechts, in: Isensee, Josef; Kirchhof, Paul (eds.): Handbuch des
Staatsrechts, vol. 7, 1992, § 173, marg. note 43, 63; Stern (n. 33), 245; Bleckmann (n. 33), 241; Bernhardt (n.
33), 160; BVerfGE 18, 112 (121).
115 BVerfGE 4, 157 (168); 36, 1 (14); cf. also BVerfGE 30, 272 (289f.) (dissenting opinion Justice Seuffert).
116 BVerfGE 4, 157 (168); for an extensive discussion cf. Zeitler (n. 37), 215ff.; Cronauer (n. 55), 34ff.
117 Hailbronner (n. 1), 26; Bernhardt (n. 33), 187f.; Bernhardt (n. 60), 461; for further critics cf. Cronauer (n. 55),
53ff.; Zeitler (n. 37), 230f.
118 Ress (n. 62), 43f.; Cronauer (n. 55), 255ff.
119 Cf. Ress (n. 62), 42 note 165.
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methods has taken place, that is limited by the possible results of these interpretive methods, and that
may never transgress the boundaries drawn by international law. The Constitutional Court has clearly
stated that constitutional interpretation will only allow a choice if and in so far as there are several
possible results of the interpretive process.120 Consequently, constitutional interpretation can never
lead to results that could not have been reached by international law methods alone. A court that
would stop the interpretation by international law rules prematurely - for instance taking only the terms
of the document into account and not object and purpose - in order to achieve sufficient ambiguity
would apply the theory of constitutional interpretation incorrectly. On the other hand, it can hardly be
denied that a court not using constitutional interpretation would not be stuck with several possible
meanings among which it could not decide, but would choose one of these meanings as the best, as
the correct one. This possible clarity of result, however, does not contradict the ambiguity argument
used in constitutional interpretation. Interpretation and application of legal norms are no purely logical,
mathematical operations that lead to a clear-cut result, with any other result being simply false.121 That
a judge or lawyer needs to and will arrive at such a specific result does not mean that he will regard
other results as wrong. He will find them less convincing, less well arguable, less well constructed, but
still accept them as possible alternatives. Apart from clearly untenable interpretations, there is
frequently a grey zone of several interpretations that are legally possible, the comparative value of
each being subject to doubt and legal arguments without any single clear and convincing solution that
could finally banish all others. When the methods of interpretation do not lead to a single solution, and,
therefore, by definition, other factors come into play, it is not illegitimate to use national constitutional
values through constitutional interpretation.
Since constitutional interpretation does not lead to results that could not have been reached by
international law methods alone, Germany will not be forced to insist on national peculiarities in the
international arena, thus rendering the settlement of any dispute much more difficult. Rather, it will
always be possible to argue on the basis of international law alone. When an agreement contains
ambivalent language, any signatory State may in good faith122 interpret it according to the rules of
international law and use this interpretation when acting under the treaty. As long as the interpretation
does not contradict the rules of international law, it is of no importance what other interests of the
State are supported by its choice of interpretation. Few would doubt the legitimacy of the executive
choosing an interpretation that will further its own political agenda. Equally, national courts - or, again,
the executive, that is bound by constitutional demands just like the judicial branch - should be allowed
to choose an interpretation that will conform with the national constitution. Unlike an interpretation with
political background, such a constitutional interpretation even serves the legal interests of the
international community: it saves the treaty from a verdict of nullity, that the executive would be forced
to carry out regardless of any international law to the contrary. Constitutional interpretation thus helps
to ensure respect for international law and to stabilize international relations.
                                                     
120 BVerfGE 4, 157 (168); cf. also Zeitler (n. 37), 248f.; Bernhardt (n. 33), 186; critical on the actual application of
that principle Cronauer (n. 55), 49, 259.
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V. Initiation
Courts are not only actors in international relations because their views must be taken into
consideration and may influence the validity and interpretation of negotiation outcomes. Courts can
also initiate negotiations, even if such situations are rare as they touch the core of foreign policy and
the corresponding responsibilities of the executive and the legislative branches.123 Thus, when a group
of German local authorities filed a lawsuit to prevent military low altitude flights above their territory,
the administrative court enjoined the Federal Republic of Germany from undertaking flights below a
certain altitude.  As to flights by NATO allies, the court realized that German authorities did not have
the right to prohibit them. Instead, it obligated the Federal Republic to at least try and commence
negotiations with its NATO allies on new low altitude flight zones and on a temporary stay of all low
altitude flights above the claimants territory, 124 Similarly, courts sometimes give the executive direct
orders on certain aspects of negotiations. Thus, the Federal Constitutional Court has required the
competent organs firstly to insist, in any negotiation with the German Democratic Republic, that
agreements which by their content could be extended to Berlin should be so extended, and secondly
only to conclude the agreement if the legal situation of Berlin and its citizens was not abridged
compared to the legal situation under the Grundgesetz.125
D. Summary and conclusion
Much of international relations theory is based on the assumption that the State is a unitary actor
(B.I.). Common sense as well as a number of case studies in international relations, however, show
that more than one actor on the State level influences the conduct and result of foreign affairs. Such
actors cannot be disregarded without loosing the possibility to correctly explain the behavior of States
in the international sphere (B.II.). Moreover, the unitary actor assumption is not fit to be transferred to
legal analysis. It is an integral part of the modeling approach, which is not used in law. Rather, legal
analysis of international negotiations aimed at the conclusion of an international agreement will have
to consider separation of powers (B.III.). In particular, negotiators have to bear in mind the influence of
the national legal order and, consequently, the possibilities and scope of judicial interference (B.IV.).
The German judiciary is not ignorant of the specifics of international negotiations. It has realized that
the terms of an international agreement are not under the sole responsibility of a national government,
but result from intensive bargaining with other actors that are not subject to German legal constraints.
The outcome of such negotiations cannot be expected to conform totally with the German position.
Consequently, the Federal Constitutional Court has developed the theory of approximation, which
                                                                                                                                                                     
121 Cf. Alexy, Robert: Theorie der juristischen Argumentation, 1983, 17.
122 Cf. Art. 31 para. 1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
123 Cf. the restrictive view by Wolfrum, Rüdiger: Tiefflüge vor den Verwaltungsgerichten: Anmerkungen zu
Urteilen des VG Darmstadt und des VG Oldenburg, NVwZ 1990, 237 (239).
124 VG Oldenburg, NJW 1989, 1942 (1947); cf. on this decision Wolfrum (n. 123), 237ff.
125 BVerfGE 36, 1 (32f.).
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turns the negotiation starting position into a constitutionally relevant factor: The government may
conclude an international agreement that does not conform with constitutional requirements if the
situation created by the agreement is at least closer to the constitution than before (C.I.). Moreover,
the Federal Constitutional Court has accepted the realities of international relations by giving a wide
margin of appreciation to the executive in its determinations and prognoses in foreign affairs (C.II.).
Very specific and sometimes difficult constitutional restrictions have been placed on the possible
outcomes of negotiations on the transfer of power to supranational organizations. Nevertheless, there
is a broad consensus today that the constitutional standard that must be fulfilled by a supranational
power with a direct influence in Germany does not have to be exactly as high as the constitutional
requirements on the German government (C.III.). Furthermore, the application of the negotiation
outcome, i.e. of a treaty, is largely influenced by the national judiciary, which enjoys extensive powers
of interpretation, based on international law and sometimes on constitutional considerations, that
should be kept in mind by negotiators (C.IV.). Finally, courts can sometimes initiate negotiations or
give the executive direct orders on certain aspects of the bargaining process (C.V.).
The influence of courts on international negotiations could be regretted, because the presence of an
additional actor renders an already complex situation even more complicated. Indeed, the role of
courts, which decide on the validity of a treaty on the basis of its contents, define those contents, give
the executive a more or less wide margin of appreciation, set specific goals or even initiate
negotiations altogether, is a factor that negotiators should not ignore. Negotiators can, however, at
least try and use these additional constraints to their favor by openly admitting them. The fact that a
country has no other choice than to insist on a certain point because its courts force it to do so, may
sometimes prove to be an argument that is as valid as a mere political desire. When negotiating
changes in the framework of the European Union, for instance, one could imagine that Germany
would not be completely unsuccessful in explaining to other member States that certain stipulations
would not pass muster in the Constitutional Court, and that the German government has no immediate
way whatsoever to change that situation. Such an explanation may come handy, even if the
government is by no means unhappy with the requirements set by the Constitutional Court. In that
sense, the influence of the courts can sometimes be used as a convenient scapegoat for political
goals.
Even more importantly, courts do not act on an independent political agenda but on the basis of law.
They impress the will of the people, often in its constitutional expression, upon the government and
ensure that the limits of governmental action in a free and democratic society are not ignored even in
the conduct of foreign affairs. At the same time, courts show a remarkable understanding of the
specific circumstances under which international negotiations are conducted and successfully try to
find a balance between the requirements of national law and the demands of international relations.
